Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology Files Amicus Brief in "Pay-for-Delay" Case Before Supreme Court

We previously reported on the battle over so-called “pay-for-delay” settlements, which puts the pharmaceutical industry versus the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) before the Supreme Court, to decide the legality of reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman cases. The case is FTC v. Actavis, Inc., et al.

Last week, the Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, among 16 other amici, filed briefs in support of respondents and the lawfulness of these payments. The other amici included: Antitrust Economists; Bayer AG and Bayer Corp.; Health Economics and Law Professors; Mediation and Negotiation Professionals; Law Professors Gregory Dolin, Kent Bernard, et al.; The American Intellectual Property Law Association; Enavail, LLC; The Generic Pharmaceutical Association]; Intellectual Property Owners Association; Merck & Co., Inc.; National Association of Manufacturers; Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (Phrma); New York Intellectual Property Law Association; Shire plc; Washington Legal Foundation; Generic Manufacturers Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc.; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.; and Impax Laboratories, Inc.

The next stop: oral argument before the Supreme Court on March 25. Stay tuned . . . .


Jillian A. Centanni is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Gibbons Institute Program to Cover Biosimilars

Why all the buzz about biosimilars?

Biosimilars, also known as follow-on biologics, are biologic medical products whose active drug substance is made by a living organism or derived from a living organism by means of recombinant DNA or controlled gene expression methods. The evolving biosimilars landscape is of concern to companies here in the U.S. and worldwide.

Next week, the Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology will be hosting “Navigating the Biosimilars Landscape,” on February 19, 2013, from 4:30 - 7:00 pm at the Seton Hall Law School in Newark, NJ. This program will provide a look at biosimilar legislation and legal aspects relating to biosimilars, as well as considerations and strategies for both innovator and biosimilar companies.

Panelists for this program include Reza Green, Vice President of Intellectual Property for Novo Nordisk, Inc.; Jordan Paradise, Associate Professor of Law at Seton Hall University School of Law; and Estelle J. Tsevdos, Ph.D.; George M. Gould and Lisa H. Wang of the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. The panel will discuss litigation under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCI), state-based legislation affecting biosimilars and the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of biosimilars.

Registration for the program starts at 4:30 pm, with the panel discussion at 5:00 pm and a networking reception following the program at 7:00 pm. The $30 program fee includes food, beverages, parking and 2.0 NY & NJ CLE Credits.

Click here for additional information or to register for this “can’t miss” program.

Proposed Bill Seeks to Answer the Pay for Delay Debate

As the so-called pay for-delay case is ripening for Supreme Court oral argument on March 25, 2013, on Tuesday a bi-partisan group of senators introduced legislation meant to strongly deter such arrangements.

The introduction of the bill, known as the "Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act," follows an annual FTC report disclosing 40 potential pay-for-delay deals struck in the 2012 fiscal year — a jump from 28 such deals in 2011. The goal of the bill is "to prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market." Such reverse payments (payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry) are considered lawful by some, and anti-competitive by others, including the FTC.

The proposed bill would establish a presumption that a drug related patent infringement settlement agreement has an anticompetitive effect and is unlawful if:

(i) an ANDA filer receives anything of value; and
 

(ii) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time.

The parties to the agreement could rebut this presumption if they can:

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the pro-competitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the agreement.

If a violation is found, the bill proposes that each party be subject to a civil penalty up to 3 times the value the party received for violating the bill.

We previously reported on the FTC's petition to the Supreme Court to resolve the apparent circuit split on the issue, where the Eleventh Circuit (followed by the Second and Federal Circuits) upheld reverse payments as long as the anti-competitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, absent sham litigation or fraud; but the Third Circuit (and FTC) believe such payments are presumptively anti-competitive.

Gibbons will continue to monitor and provide updates on this important upcoming decision.


Lisa H. Wang is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Christopher H. Strate, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Review Lead Compound Test for Obviousness Analysis

On Monday, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Apotex seeking review of the Federal Circuit’s May 7, 2012, ruling that affirmed the District Court of New Jersey’s judgment that Otsuka’s patents covering its blockbuster drug Abilify© are valid and not obvious.

In that ruling, the Federal Circuit found no error in the District Court’s application of the so-called lead compound test; an analytical framework in chemical art cases that seeks -- in an obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103 -- to determine whether a POSA (“person of ordinary skill in the art”) would select the proffered prior art as a “lead compound.” Specifically, in a lead compound analysis, the Court will consider:

the hypothetical person of skill in the art’s identification of a lead compound, structural differences between the proposed lead compound and the claimed invention, motivation or teachings in the prior art to make the necessary changes to arrive at the claimed invention, and whether the person of skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success in making such structural changes.

Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. et al., (citing Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-1000, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132595, at *52-53 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010)). In its decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that the POSA would have considered the only marketed antipsychotic compounds at the time - clozapine and risperidone - as viable lead compounds and not the carbostyril compound developed by Otsuka.

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the District Court properly rejected the defendants’ proposed lead compounds. It held that a POSA would not have understood that each of a “laundry list” of carbostyril derivative compounds disclosed in a prior art reference to possess the reported central nervous system controlling effects. Nor would a POSA select a compound that was inferior to other test compounds or shown not to be an acceptable therapeutic candidate.


Charles H. Chevalier is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Todd M. Nosher, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

DNJ Rejects Double-Patenting Claim

Last week, in Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., the District of New Jersey ruled on summary judgment that Gilead Sciences did not unlawfully extend its patent protection on oseltamivir (Tamiflu), a neuraminidase inhibitor used to treat the flu, covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,763,483 (“the ’483 patent”). Natco Pharma sought to invalidate the ‘483 patent for obviousness-type double patenting in its attempt to market a generic version of Tamiflu prior to the patent’s expiration. Natco had alleged, inter alia, that the claims of the ’483 patent were invalid due to obviousness-type double-patenting over Gilead’s later issued U.S. Patent No. 5,952,375 (“the ’375 patent”).

Obviousness-type double-patenting is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to preclude an inventor from unjustifiably extending patent protection beyond the statutory limit. The relevant inquiry requires a two-step analysis: first, as a matter of law, a court construes the claim in the earlier patent and the claim in the later patent and determines any differences; second, a court decides if the differences between the two claims demonstrate a patentable distinction. Slip op. at 5, citations omitted.

Here, District of New Jersey Judge Susan A. Wigenton was presented with the nuanced-question of whether a later-issued, but earlier-expiring patent can be used as a reference to invalidate an earlier-issued, later-expiring patent. Id. Gilead’s ‘375 patent issued in September 1999 and claimed priority over a family of patent applications dating as far back as February 1995. The ‘483 patent issued in June 1998 from an application filed in December 1995. Analagous questions were previously considered by the District of Delaware last year. See Abbott Labs. v. Lupin Ltd., 2011 WL 1897322 (D. Del. May 19, 2011); Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Del. 2011). And, similar disputes can be expected going forward due to practical anomalies now arising from enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (the “URAA”), which changed the length of patent terms in the United States from the former period of 17 years calculated from the date of patent grant, to 20 years from the earliest effective filing date (effective June 8, 1995)).

The Court agreed with Gilead -- and the above-listed District of Delaware opinions -- that a later-issued, earlier-expiring patent cannot invalidate an earlier-issued, later-expiring patent on the basis of obviousness-type double patenting. The Court reasoned that the ’375 patent cannot serve as a reference patent since it was issued after, and terminates before, the ’483 patent, and therefore does not unlawfully extend Gilead’s right to exclusivity. Accordingly, the Court found that the lifespan of Gilead’s patents was not a result of gamesmanship, but instead resulted from changes to the patent laws.


Todd M. Nosher is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Ralph A. Dengler, Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

District of New Jersey Stays Pay-For-Delay Cases Pending High Court's Decision in K-Dur

Defendants in reverse-payment actions pending in the Third Circuit (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) take note: in In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation the Honorable Joel A. Pisano, U.S.D.J., of the District of New Jersey has stayed several class-action litigations challenging the legality of certain reverse-payment settlement agreements between Wyeth and generic drug manufacturer Teva Pharmaceuticals, pursuant to which Wyeth allegedly paid Teva to delay its marketing of a generic counterpart to Wyeth’s Effexor XR drug.

Judge Pisano issued the stay in light of the pending petition for certiorari with respect to the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, which created a circuit split by holding that reverse-payment settlement agreements constitute “prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade” in violation of federal antitrust laws, even if the settlement agreement does not exceed the scope of the patent in suit. Other circuits, in contrast, have upheld such reverse-payment agreements when the agreement corresponds to the scope of the patent. We previously reported here and here on the circuit split and the pending petitions for certiorari on this issue.

Judge Pisano’s stay is to continue until the K-Dur proceedings in the Supreme Court have been concluded. Thus, if the Supreme Court hears K-Dur on the merits, the length of the stay could be significant.


Christopher Walsh is a Director in the Gibbons Business & Commercial Litigation Department. This blog post originally appeared on Gibbons Business Litigation Alert on October 24, 2012.

FTC Petitions for Certiorari in Reverse Payments Dispute

As we anticipated, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a petition for certiorari yesterday with the Supreme Court in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

In that case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld reverse payments (payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry under the scope-of-the-patent approach, i.e., as long as the anti-competitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, absent sham litigation or fraud), as lawful. The Second and Federal Circuits follow that approach. In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that such payments are presumptively anti-competitive under the “quick look rule of reason analysis” that may be rebutted by showing that the payments was for something other than delay or that the payment has a competitive benefit, and thereby increases competition.

The FTC’s petition, filed by the U.S. Solicitor General, exhorts the Supreme Court to take up the case to resolve this clear Circuit split. The FTC’s petition urges the Court to adopt the Third Circuit’s interpretation that reverse-payment agreements are presumptively anti-competitive.

Clearly, much is at stake here; Gibbons will continue to monitor developments.


Charles H. Chevalier is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Todd M. Nosher, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on Reverse Payments in ANDA Cases -- Revisited

We have written previously on numerous developments concerning reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman litigation settlements (i.e., payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry of proposed generic products).

Earlier this month, we reported that Merck & Co. had filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari seeking to challenge the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. holding that reverse payments are prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.

It now appears the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) will follow suit and file its own petition for Certiorari in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 10-12729, where the Eleventh Circuit upheld reverse payments -- finding no antitrust violation in settlements involving generic Androgel. Indeed, FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, speaking last week at Fordham’s 39th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, suggested the likelihood that FDA will file such petition with the High Court on or before the October 16, 2012 deadline. Challenges to the conflicting Third and Eleventh Circuit decisions will virtually assure Supreme Court review of the antitrust implications of reverse payments.

Gibbons will continue to track the status of this potential petition and other developments relating to reverse payments including the Supreme Court’s likely grants of Certiorari. Stay tuned for more on these important developments.


Todd M. Nosher is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Charles H. Chevalier, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on Reverse Payments in ANDA Cases?

We previously reported on developments in various United States Courts of Appeal decisions concerning reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman litigation settlements - that is, payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry of the generic product.

Most recently, as we reported here, the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. bucked prior holdings of the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits, ruling that a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation and, therefore, serves as evidence of unreasonable restraints of trade. In light of the Third Circuit’s divergent decision from other circuit precedent, many predicted a subsequent Petition for Certiorari.

As expected, Merck & Co. recently filed its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, citing this split of circuit authority as the compelling factor favoring a review by the Supreme Court.

Gibbons will continue to track the status of this pending petition and other developments relating to reverse payments. Of particular interest will be whether the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) opts to file its own Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in connection with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision upholding a reverse payment in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 10-12729 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012). Stay tuned for more on these important developments.


Todd M. Nosher is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Update - Hatch-Waxman Settlements: The FTC Regains Traction After Third Circuit Rules That Reverse Payments Violate Antitrust Law

As a follow-up to a previous article, the FTC has finally gotten an Appeals Court to take its view of reverse payments - Wile E. Coyote won this one. The FTC previously unsuccessfully attempted multiple avenues to invalidate reverse payments as part of Hatch-Waxman settlements - via the District Courts, proposed legislation, state court systems, and even the Supreme Court - but the Third Circuit has finally bitten, setting a clear circuit split.

Will the Supreme Court now step in? It could not have a clearer invitation - both the Third and Eleventh Circuits have analyzed the exact settlement agreement with resulting opposite holdings. Cf. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).

This week, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that reverse payments (sometimes referred to as “pay-to-delay”) as part of the settlement of Hatch-Waxman litigations are evidence of unreasonable restraints of trade. Specifically, the Court in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. found that a settlement payment made by a pharmaceutical patent holder to a generic challenger - where there was an agreement to postpone market entry in exchange for the payment - constitutes prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.

Five circuits previously addressed the legality of reverse payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman actions. While earlier decisions in the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit held reverse payment settlements to be illegal, those decisions were based on agreements that extended beyond the scope of the patents-in-suit. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001); and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh, Second and Federal Circuits held that reverse payments, if limited to the exclusionary zone of the patent, were acceptable. The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., without qualification, held that reverse payments between patent holders and generic competitors constitute prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. In its decision, the Third Circuit squarely rejected the “scope of the patent test” as limiting antitrust law, and held that reverse payments are contrary to public policy and Supreme Court precedent.

In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit placed a premium on public policy issues, stressing the importance of the Court in eliminating weak patents. Its view is that the scope of the patent test tends to protect companies with bigger wallets, that could pay off multiple challengers rather than risk losses in litigation. The Court rejects the scope of the presumption of patent validity, stating that “this presumption is intended merely as a procedural device and not a substantive right of the patent holder.” Slip op. at 27. The Court views patent validity as simply a “legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office,” noting that many patents are later found to be invalid or not infringed. Id.

The Third Circuit also emphasized the underlying goal of Hatch-Waxman - to “increase the availability of low cost generic drugs.” Slip op. at 31. In rejecting any analysis of the patent suit, the Court instead adopted the FTC’s view that any payment represents a quid pro quo for deferring entry beyond that which would have occurred as part of a reasonable litigation compromise. Id. at 33. The Court also sought to buttress its decision with the Supreme Court’s decision in Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., analogizing reverse payments with the situation where a licensor cannot be estopped from challenging a patent with a violative price fixing provision. Slip op. at 29 (citing 329 U.S. 394 (1947)).

The Third Circuit decided to enter the fray and has set up a clear circuit split, thus inviting the Supreme Court to join the issue. Practitioners should consider the ramifications of this decision for clients on both sides of the negotiation table. Gibbons P.C. will continue to track this reverse payment issue, including the likely certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court.


Sheila F. McShane is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Jillian A. Centanni, an Apprentice in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

New Jersey Ranked No. 2 for Biotechnology Strength

According to a press release from the Governor’s office, a recent review issued by Business Facilities magazine reported that New Jersey jumped eight positions to rank second for biotechnology strength among U.S. states.

Some of the factors cited as responsible for this improvement include increases in R&D tax credits (from 50% to 100%) and the adoption of a new single sales factor formula for corporate tax liability, which will reduce company costs.

This development follows the 2011 Jones Lang LaSalle report that identified the biotech region of New Jersey/New York as the Number 2 region behind Boston. The report further forecasts a bright future for the life science industry for this region.

There to meet these expanding biotech clients' needs, the Gibbons Intellectual Property Group offers the largest intellectual property group among all general practice law firms in New Jersey, including ranks of attorneys with life sciences experience prepared to counsel on all aspects of IP law. Bill Epstein, Charlie Gaglia, George Gould, David De Lorenzi, Sheila McShane, Hain Swope, Estelle Tsevdos, Lisa Wang, Charles Chevalier, Jay Cahill and Jillian Centanni, among others, bring diverse and deep industry and legal experience to the firm’s IP practice, with vast acumen in handling issues from IP clearance, procurement to enforcement, monetization and litigation.

Save the Date: Rutgers Pharmaceutical Management Program, July 19-20, 2012

Gibbons P.C. is again proud to announce a two-day program for Pharmaceutical Management at the Rutgers University Blanche and Irwin Lerner Center for Pharmaceutical Studies in Newark, NJ. The program, which is open to the public, includes in-depth presentations relating to topics including intellectual property, regulatory, financial and marketing issues relating to the pharmaceutical industry, as well as drug development and the role of biotechnology in pharmaceutical development.

Gibbons P.C. will sponsor the luncheon on July 19th from 12:00 - 1:10 PM immediately after which veteran Gibbons IP Department attorneys will give presentations on issues germane to the pharmaceutical industry. Charles A. Gaglia, Jr., Esq. will discuss the importance of patents to the industry and how patents are obtained and enforced. Sheila F. McShane, Esq. will follow with a presentation concerning the interrelation of patent and regulatory issues and rights and the Hatch-Waxman Act. Ms. McShane also will discuss the balance among patent rights, generic competition and the government agencies involved therein.

For more information on the program, click here.

Those interested in this important program should contact the Rutgers Business School-Newark, 1 Washington Park, Room 464, Newark, NJ 07102, (973) 353-1234.

Program in Pharmaceutical Management - April 26-27, 2012

Gibbons is proud to once again sponsor lunch at the Rutgers Business School’s Blanche and Irwin Lerner Center for Pharmaceutical Management Studies Program on Thursday, April 26, and Friday, April 27, at Rutgers Business School - Newark, One Washington Park, Room 1027, 10th Floor.

Prior to the lunch on April 26, Charlie Gaglia and Sheila McShane of the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department will present, “Patents and Intellectual Property Rights" from 10:50 am - 12:05 pm.

The two-day program will address timely topics in the pharmaceutical industry, including the regulatory environment; intellectual property issues; marketing, biotech emergence; financial performance metrics; managed care and drug development.

The full agenda for this insightful two-day program can be viewed here.

Astra v. Apotex: CAFC Affirms Non-infringement of Method of Use Claims

In AstraZeneca Pharms. LP. v. Apotex Corp., the Federal Circuit ruled that an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), filed under § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) and limited to FDA approved, but unpatented uses of a medication, is not an act of infringement of Orange Book-listed patents covering approved but different uses of the same medication. The Court did find that Plaintiff’s allegation that its listed patents are infringed was sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the generic Defendants.

As we previously wrote, AstraZeneca and its co-plaintiffs (“AstraZeneca”) had sued ten generic drug companies alleging patent infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act, relating to methods of treatment using Crestor®. The lower court had dismissed the infringement claims, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because AstraZeneca had not presented a valid § 271(e)(2) claim based on the ANDA filings alone. The court also dismissed AstraZeneca’s other 271(e)(2) infringement claims as premature. That claim alleged that because the FDA will require the defendants to amend their ANDAs at some point in the future to include all FDA-approved indications, including those covered by the patents-in-suit, infringement under § 271(e)(2) would occur.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the subject matter jurisdiction decision, finding that jurisdictional requirements are met once a patent owner alleges that another’s filing of an ANDA infringes its patent under § 271(e)(2). Also, the court held that this threshold determination does not depend on the ultimate merits of the claims.

However, the court affirmed the ruling as to the lack of ripeness of the infringement claim, citing its holding in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) that Section 271(e)(2) does not encompass “speculative” claims for infringement. Importantly, the Federal Circuit noted that regardless of a possible future occurrence, the infringement analysis under § 271(e)(2) is limited to whether the accused infringer’s ANDA seeks approval for activities that would constitute infringement of the asserted patents. Accordingly, it could not conclude that the FDA would require the ANDA filers to amend their applications in the future, in part because the statutory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for the affirmative carving out of patented indications under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).

This decision is significant for generic drug manufacturers who seek such a carve out of non-patented, approved indications. Industry -- and perhaps legislative -- reaction will be closely watched.


Charles A. Gaglia, Jr. is Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. R. Hain Swope, Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

IP Law 2012: A Look Ahead . . . .

Coming off a year that included the Smith-Leahy “America Invents Act,” 2012 portends to have some significant developments in IP law.

Decisions for IP practitioners and industry to watch for include:

  • the Supreme Court’s decision in Caraco Pharm. Labs. Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, regarding “use codes” and section viii carve-outs under the Hatch-Waxman Act;
  • the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus, regarding patentable subject matter, post-Bilski; and
  • the Federal Circuit’s upcoming en banc decisions in McKesson and Akamai, regarding joint infringement liability.

In the trademark realm, the 2d Circuit’s decision in Louboutin, regarding trademarking colors.

Locally, the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act is expected to be signed into law, which will codify the State’s common law practice regarding trade secrets. Also, implementation of the Southern District of New York’s 18-month pilot program on conducting complex litigations will be underway.

On the national level, the launch of the Intellectual Property Exchange International (“IPXI”), an exchange for commoditizing patents and other IP assets is expected in June.

And finally, just as on-going developments with and implementation of the Smith-Leahy America Invents Act progresses, Congress will continue to address the Stop Online Piracy Act.

Gibbons, with offices in Newark, Trenton, New York City, Wilmington and Philadelphia will continue to remain at the forefront of these, and all other IP law developments.


Ralph A. Dengler is Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Jillian A. Centanni, an Apprentice in the Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

Federal Circuit Vacates Grant of Preliminary Injunction on Procedural Grounds

Last week in Warner Chilcott Labs Ireland Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., the Federal Circuit vacated a grant of preliminary injunction in a Hatch-Waxman case by the District Court of New Jersey. The Federal Circuit acted after the lower court granted a preliminary injunction without either holding an evidentiary hearing or making any findings as to the defendants’ invalidity defense.

The case arises out of Mylan’s filing of an ANDA to market a generic version of Doryx. One month before the 30-month stay expired and Mylan having received tentative approval from the FDA, Warner Chilcott moved for a preliminary injunction against a possible at risk-launch by Mylan. Warner Chilcott’s infringement case turned on whether Mylan’s ANDA product had a “stabilizing coat” as required under the patent in suit. The parties submitted briefs and expert witness declarations, and the court heard oral arguments from both parties on the traditional four factors for injunctive relief: irreparable harm; likelihood of success on the merits; balance of hardships; and the public interest. However, the court did not hold a live evidentiary hearing to hear the testimony of the battling experts, citing scheduling demands and a pressing criminal trial. Instead, the court deferred addressing those issues until the upcoming bench trial. In addition, the court also declined to make any factual determinations as to Mylan’s invalidity challenge. Ultimately, the lower court acknowledged that there were questions of facts to be resolved on the issue of a “stabilizing coat” and it enjoined Mylan from marketing its ANDA product until after trial on the merits.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision. Writing for the court, Justice O’Malley held that it was an abuse of discretion under established Third Circuit law to grant a preliminary injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing when there were unresolved issues of fact in dispute. In addition, the Federal Circuit also faulted the lower court for making only passing reference to Mylan’s invalidity challenge, and its likelihood of success, without providing an adequate factual record for appellate review.

Although the preliminary injunction decision was vacated, the Federal Circuit permitted the district court to enter a temporary restraining order until a consolidated preliminary injunction hearing and bench trial on the merits can be held. Thus, Mylan’s success at the Federal Circuit may only be a pyrrhic victory as it may be temporarily restrained until the merits of the patent case are resolved at trial.


Lisa H. Wang is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. John J. Cahill, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

The Hatch Waxman Act and Induced Infringement

Oral argument was recently heard before the Federal Circuit in the appeal of AstraZeneca Pharms. LP. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. AstraZeneca, along with IPR Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc., (“Plaintiffs) sued ten generic drug companies alleging infringement of US Patent Nos. 6,858,618 (“the ‘618 patent”) and 7,030,152 (“the ‘152 patent”) under the Hatch-Waxman Act. These patents claim methods of treatment using rosuvastatin calcium, which Plaintiffs market as Crestor®.

The ten generic drug companies had filed abbreviated new drug applications (“ANDA”) with the U.S. FDA seeking to market generic versions of the drug to treat nonfamilial hypercholesterolemia, homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia or hypertriglyceridemia, uses which were not covered by the two method of use patents, but were FDA approved uses.

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ generic tablets, if approved by the FDA, will be prescribed and administered to human patients according to the Crestor® label to treat heterozygous familial hypercholesterolemia (“HeFH”) and for the primary prevention of cardiovascular disease, which uses will constitute direct infringement of the ‘618 and ‘152 patents, respectively. As noted, the ANDA filed by the Defendants did not embody a use claimed in the patents. Plaintiffs alleged the claimed uses will occur nonetheless because the generic label will mirror the Crestor® label, and will be uses that Defendants know or should know will occur. Therefore, Defendants will actively induce, encourage, aid and abet this prescription and administration, with knowledge and specific intent that these uses infringe Plaintiffs’ rights under the ‘618 and ‘152 patents.

The issue before the district court hinged on standing to sue under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), i.e., whether a cause of action was made out with respect to Defendants’ proposed uses relative to the patents’ claims. The relevant language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) is:

2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit -

(A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent.

Before the Delaware District Court, Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act created an infringement claim only if the generic manufacturer sought approval for the specific methods of treatment claimed by the patent. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs case under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) lacked merit because of the generics’ non-infringing uses. The district court agreed with Defendants and Plaintiffs appealed.

In oral arguments before the Federal Circuit in November, Plaintiffs argued that the mere filing of an ANDA for rosuvastatin calcium tablets was an act of infringement under the Hatch Waxman Act even though the ANDA was for non-infringing uses of the drug. Plaintiffs also urged that there was enough evidence in the generic manufacturer’s proposed labeling and elsewhere to support the likelihood of induced infringement.

Chief Justice Rader and Justice Moore pointed out several times during oral arguments that in order for 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) to apply, it requires that the ANDA seek approval for the use of a drug which is claimed in a patent. In this case, the ANDA does not seek approval for a patented use. The Justices cited the Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp. decision, which held that “where a product has substantial non-infringing uses, intent to induce infringement cannot be inferred even when the [alleged inducer] has actual knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the patent.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[I]nducement requires that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.” DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part). Plaintiffs argued that Warner Lambert did not apply to the facts at hand.

Chief Justice Rader also indicated to Defendants’ counsel that due to the limited uses in the ANDA, there was a substantial likelihood the generics would induce infringement. He raised the question as to whether the generic companies could win an inducement to infringement suit.

A decision for AstraZeneca would strengthen method of treatment patents for prescription drugs and expand the reach of Hatch-Waxman. Gibbons P.C. will stay tuned to this development.


Charles A. Gaglia, Jr. is Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Mark Your Calendars: Pharmaceutical Management Studies Program, October 27-28

Gibbons P.C. will once again sponsor lunch at the upcoming Rutgers University/Blanche and Irwin Lerner Center for Pharmaceutical Management Studies Program on Thursday, October 27, from 12:00 - 1:00 pm at Rutgers Business School - Newark.

Prior to the luncheon, from 10:30 am - 12:00 pm, Gibbons attorneys Charles A. Gaglia, Jr. and Sheila F. McShane will present, "Patents and Intellectual Property Rights," a discussion of recent legal developments and trends affecting the pharmaceutical industry.

The full agenda for this two-day program may be viewed here.

The Federal Circuit Affirms in AstraZeneca v. Apotex, Finding Induced Infringement Based On Use of FDA-Mandated Labeling

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex Inc. illustrates the tension that generic drug manufacturers may face between complying with FDA labeling requirements and avoiding trespassing on others’ patent rights. In that decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court of New Jersey’s ruling enjoining Apotex’s “at risk” launch of a generic version of an inhaled corticosteroid for asthma patients. In short, AstraZeneca owned a method patent on once-daily dosing of the drug at issue. Although Apotex omitted all references to once-daily dosages from its product label, it was required by the FDA to include “downward titration” language that encouraged patients to reduce their daily intake of the drug to the lowest dose that provides a beneficial effect. AstraZeneca argued that this language induced patients to infringe its method patent, and the court agreed.

For its part, Apotex argued that it lacked the specific intent required to induce infringement because its product label did not instruct patients to engage in the infringing once-daily dosing, and because its instructions allowed for non-infringing use of the drug. The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. Rather, it agreed with the lower court that the language encouraging reduced intake would necessarily result in some users engaging in AstraZeneca’s patented method. The court also found that Apotex’s attempt to design its label around the infringing use showed that it had the requisite knowledge and intent to induce infringement.

Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) a generic seeking approval from the FDA for a method of use not claimed in a ‘method of use patent’ for a listed drug must submit a statement declaring the patent does not claim such a use and must remove any mention of the patented method of use from the generic drug label. During its review of Apotex’s label, the FDA concluded that Apotex could omit references to the claimed “once-daily” dosing without sacrificing safety and efficacy. The FDA also found that the downward titration language did not “teach” once-daily dosing. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the FDA is not the arbiter of patent infringement issues and that the mere existence of non-infringing uses does not preclude infringement.

The case is particularly interesting because of the dilemma that Apotex faced. It could not sell its drug without including the FDA-mandated downward titration language. Nonetheless, it was precisely that language that resulted in sales of the drug being enjoined.


John J. Cahill is an apprentice in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Southern District of New York Denies Request for Advance Notice of an at Risk Launch

Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a generic drug manufacturer may not be required to provide advance notice to the innovator of their intent to launch at-risk a competing product. This decision is noteworthy in that it contrasts with the practice in the District Court of New Jersey where at least one generic company has been ordered to provide advance notice to the brand companies of an impending at-risk launch.

In Teva et al. v. Sandoz, Inc., 08-7611 (S.D.N.Y. October 12, 2010), the district court for the Southern District of New York, denied Teva's request for 10 days advance notice of Sandoz’s launch at risk of a generic version of Copaxone®. The court held that, “[w]hile other courts may have, in other circumstances, ordered generic drug makers to provide another party with notice of its intent and ability to launch, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to do so here.” The court found that Sandoz had no legal obligation to provide Teva with advance notice, particularly since there are no regulatory impediments by the FDA barring entry of Sandoz’s generic product. As such, the court held that ordering Sandoz to provide advance notice would effectively require it to disclose confidential business information to Teva. The court also dismissed Teva’s argument that advance notice could potentially avoid “saddling” the court with an emergency request for a temporary restraining order, noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 sufficiently addresses any such concerns.


Lisa H. Wang is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Hatch-Waxman Settlements: Under Attack on Many Fronts

Is an end coming for reverse payment settlements of Hatch-Waxman litigations?

The FTC, like Wile E. Coyote chasing The Road Runner, has been doggedly challenging settlements between brand name pharmaceutical companies and generics to resolve Hatch-Waxman litigations. Reverse payments settlements, which the FTC calls “pay-for-delay” deals, where Hatch-Waxman litigations are settled by the brand name drug company’s payment to the generics to stay off the market, have been the main target of the FTC since the late 1990’s. The FTC’s position is that reverse payments impermissibly thwart less expensive generic drugs from timely reaching consumers. While there is a circuit court split on the issue, the recent trend of courts, including the Federal Circuit, has been that reverse payments are acceptable because they are “within the exclusionary zone of the patent and thus [cannot] be redressed by federal antitrust law.” In re Ciprofloxacin (“Cipro”) Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).

The Supreme Court has yet refused to weight in on reverse payments, denying certiorari this past summer despite the FTC’s, and, more recently, the DOJ’s entreaties to take up the issue in the Cipro case. Previously, the DOJ had remained on the sidelines in reverse payment fights, but under the Obama administration’s guidance, the DOJ is now advocating that reverse payments be prohibited. The DOJ’s position on the issue has struck the path for the new kid on the block in the war on reverse payments: Congress.

In Cipro, DOJ’s briefing to the Supreme Court advocated a presumption shift: that a prima facie antitrust claim for reverse payments could be established by showing only that the settlement was a result of consideration provided to the generic by the branded patentee, accompanied by the generic withdrawal of its challenge. The prima facie case could then, however, be rebutted upon a showing that reverse settlement did not unreasonably restrain competition.

As you sow, so shall you reap, and in the flurry of legislative activity that has recently ensued, the proposed presumption shift has now made its way into a proposed amendment to antitrust laws. On October 15, 2009, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate passed a bill that could effectively ban the use of reverse payments to settle Hatch-Waxman actions. The bill, known as the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, would amend the Clayton Antitrust Act, and as initially proposed, would have made reverse payments per se illegal. The bill was subsequently amended to make the payments presumptively illegal, where the presumption can be rebutted upon a showing of a promotion of competition under a clear and convincing standard.

The new proposed legislation again raises the classic dilemma: at what point do antitrust curbs impermissibly cut into patent exclusivity? Given that reverse payments are viewed favorably by both branded drug companies and generics because they provide business flexibility for Hatch-Waxman action settlements, future fights on this issue inevitably remain to be fought.


Sheila F. McShane is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.