IP Law Alert : Intellectual Property Lawyers & Attorneys : Gibbons Law Firm : Copyrights, Patent Infringement, Unfair Competition

When the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Bon Tool, it unwittingly triggered an avalanche of litigation against major corporations brought under 35 U.S.C. § 292, the false marking statute. The opinion resolved a split of authority regarding whether a manufacturer of a product could be subjected to a fine based on each article that had been falsely marked, or each decision to mark the article. Combined with the fact that the qui tam nature of the false marking statute obviated the need to establish traditional Article III standing, a new breed of patent trolls sprung into existence seemingly overnight, dedicated to the task of tracking down mis-marked products, and seeking to share half of a maximum $500 per falsely marked item bounty. The economic appeal in bringing such suits is obvious. A major manufacturer could potentially produce millions of falsely marked articles. Even if a court decided not to assess the full $500 penalty (which it has discretion to do), a successful plaintiff could still stand to reap a sizeable award based on the sheer number of falsely marked articles injected into the stream of commerce. Since that time, several cases have been decided that have helped to provide guidance to litigants on both sides of this rapidly evolving area of law.

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The Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology hosted a webinar on July 1 to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos that addressed the limitations on the patentability of business methods. More than 50 people listened to this webinar, which featured Erik Lillquist, Senior Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; Robert E. Rudnick, Director, Intellectual Property, Gibbons P.C., and David W. Opderbeck, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology, Seton Hall University School of Law.

The panelists reviewed, analyzed and discussed the implications of this decision with regard to patent protection in those industries employing business method and related software patents. Of particular interest to industry professionals and patent practitioners, Robert Rudnick provided a helpful list of best practices and tips for obtaining corresponding patent protection and enforcement in view of this important Supreme Court decision.

The webinar has been archived online and can be accessed by clicking here.

Robert E. Rudnick is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

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The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in an attempt to offer patent applicants more choices, recently proposed establishing a three-tiered examination system. Under the current system, with the exception of accelerated examination and those cases granted “special” status, all non-provisional patent applications go into the same queue for examination and are taken up in due course. Under the new proposal, an applicant would be able to choose either prioritized examination (Tier I), traditional examination (Tier II) or delayed examination (Tier III).

USPTO’s Goal is to Reduce Time to Issuance to One Year
Currently, a first office action occurs on average at 27.2 months and a patent takes, on average, 34.6 months to issue.

Tier I priority examination, is shooting for 4 months to first office action and 12 months to issuance. The goal of the proposed amendment is to provide applicants more flexibility in managing prosecution, reducing prosecution pendency, and enhancing efficiency, all without impacting the current workload or time to issuance of traditional (Tier II) applications.

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On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court handed down a highly anticipated decision affirming the Federal Circuit in Bilski v. Kappos. At issue in Bilski was the patentability of a claimed business method or process for hedging against the risk of price changes in an energy market. The Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision to reject Bilski’s process claims as being unpatentable, but split in its opinion as to the grounds for rejecting the claims.

The majority opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Kennedy, joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas and Alito, and joined in part by Justice Scalia. The Court held that the “machine-or-transformation” test applied by the Federal Circuit to reject Bilski’s business method claims is not the sole test to be considered in determining whether a claimed process is a “patent-eligible” process. In particular the Court stated that the test may be insufficient for determining the patentability of inventions concerning emerging technologies including, for example, software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression and the manipulation of digital signals.

The Court rejected the outright exclusion of process claims directed to so-called “business methods,” finding that the scope of such an exclusion was unclear and that Congress’ “prior use” defense to the infringement of business method claims as expressed in 35 U.S.C. §§ 273 (a)(3), (b)(1) would be meaningless if such claims were fully excluded from consideration as patent-eligible inventions.

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On April 2, 2010, the USPTO issued a press release and published in the Federal Register a request for comment on a proposed change that would effectively give applicants a 12-month extension to the current provisional application period. Under the current rules, an applicant must file a nonprovisional application within 12-months after the filing of a provisional application pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) and must thereafter complete any missing parts to that application within a time period of up to a maximum of seven months.

The latest proposed revision to the missing part practice would now give applicants an additional 12-month period under which to complete this application. Even with the new proposed revision, a nonprovisional application must still be filed within the first 12-month period following the filing of a provisional application and have a properly executed oath or declaration along with at least one claim. Applicants, however, will now be given up to a year rather than seven months to complete the nonprovisional application by payment of the required search fee and a nominal late payment surcharge. It should be noted that this change would not affect foreign filings, which must still be filed within 12 months after the filing date of a provisional application in accordance with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Also, by exploiting the delayed payment, an applicant foregoes his right to opt not to have the patent application published at 18 months from the provisional patent application filing date.

The USPTO believes that by providing this additional time, applicants may now “ascertain the value of their inventions, thereby helping applicants decide whether to incur the additional costs associated with pursuing patent rights.” While initially expending only a relatively low cost to file the application, the applicant may now take the additional 12-month period to focus their time and efforts on commercialization. Additionally, the USPTO explained that, under the current statutory scheme, applicants routinely file several nonprovisional applications, which are dependant on various provisional applications. By providing an additional 12-month period, the USPTO believes that this will “help applicants focus on their most important applications and conserve USPTO resources.”

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In Barclays Capital Inc. v. TheFlyOnTheWall.com, 06 Civ. 4908 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2010), Judge Denise Cote issued a narrowly tailored injunction against republication of financial services firms stock recommendations.

FlyOnTheWall.com (Fly) collected and published summaries of stock analyst reports within minutes after they were released by financial institutions to their clients. FlyOnTheWall sometimes included summaries of the research reports, but following commencement of the suit it only published headlines such as "EQIX: Equinox initiated with a Buy at BofA/Merrill." Three financial institutions filed suit against Fly for hot news misappropriation and copyright infringement.

After denying the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, Judge Cote held a bench trial. She made extensive findings regarding the business models of the financial institutions, including how each one devotes substantial efforts to developing original research and provides its research to clients at no charge in the hope the client will place trades with the firm based on the recommendations. She described how each institution conducts a morning call at roughly 7:15 am, and the substantial efforts by the institutions to reach their clients beginning at 8 am and continuing to mid-day and sometimes over two days. She also made findings about the firms' efforts to restrict access to the research, to control press coverage for 4 hours or until 2 pm, and their surveillance programs. The court also credited evidence that the unauthorized redistribution of recommendations was a major contributor to the decline in the resources each firm devotes to equity research.

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Last week, the Supreme Court issued its highly-anticipated decision in Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick. The decision arose out of a class action settlement between publishers and authors following the Supreme Court’s holding affirming copyright infringement in New York Times, Co. v. Tasini. The Southern District of New York certified the settlement, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that pursuant to §411(a) of the Copyright Act, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement because the settlement covered both registered and unregistered works. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the registration requirement of §411(a) was a claim processing rule and not a jurisdictional requirement. It left open, however, the question of how strictly §411(a) should be applied.

The Second Circuit Decision

During proceedings before the Second Circuit in Reed Elsevier, the court sua sponte asked the parties to brief the issue of whether §411(a) was a jurisdictional requirement. In response, all parties filed briefs asserting that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement. The Second Circuit ruled that the district court lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction necessary to certify the settlement because some of the works at issue were unregistered. Certiorari was granted to resolve the question of whether §411(a) restricts the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Because no party’s brief supported the Second Circuit’s holding that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court assigned an amicus to draft the brief in support of the Second Circuit’s holding.

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With the U.S. economy still reeling from the aftershock of what is now known as the “Great Recession,” companies large and small are evaluating cloud computing as a means of reducing IT costs. The National Institute of Standards and Technologies (“NIST”) and the Cloud Security Alliance have defined cloud computing as a model for on-demand network access to a shared pool of computing resources over the internet, namely software applications, data servers, networks and other services. Just as businesses and consumers now pay for gas, electricity and other utilities, cloud enthusiasts predict that the cloud will be sold on demand as a pure IT service.

The Silver Lining

Industry groups like ISACA recognize the silver lining in the cloud. For example, there are potential cost savings in the economies of scale that are achievable in a shared computing environment. The cloud also allows companies to scale without any major software or hardware investment. Thus, cloud users are able to deploy new services more rapidly than they could in a traditional IT model. Cloud computing also can accommodate changing business requirements in a flexible and scalable format. By relocating IT services to the cloud, moreover, companies are freed to focus on their core businesses, improve processes, innovate and increase productivity. In short, the promise of cloud computing is compelling – convert IT private networks to an on-demand, pay-as-you-go IT utility service that produces substantial savings for users.

Storm Clouds Gathering

While the benefits of the cloud are clear, the recent security breaches reported by Google highlight just some of the attendant risks. Google notified users that it inadvertently shared private Document and Spreadsheet materials with contacts that were never granted access to them. In response to cloud computing risks, The Electronic Privacy Information Center, an industry watchdog, has filed an FTC complaint to investigate the privacy and security measures of Gmail, Google Docs and Google’s other “cloud computing” services. Even John Chambers, Cisco Systems’ Chairman and CEO, has conceded that the computing industry’s move to an on-demand IT service on the Internet was “a security nightmare.” And, Microsoft now has joined the bandwagon and called on U.S. legislators to enact a “Cloud Computing Advancement Act.”

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Recently certain members of the patent law bar have expressed surprise that the Federal Circuit has used the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph to invalidate patents such as the University of California’s patent directed to insulin in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., and Genentech’s patent directed to production of human growth hormone in Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S. This issue has come to the forefront again in Ariad’s pending per curiam appeal from the Federal Circuit decision in Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., vacated and rehearing en banc granted. Oral argument in the case was held on December 7, 2009. In the case under appeal, the Ariad patent was held not to meet the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph.

The surprise of the patent bar to the Federal Circuit’s use of this written description requirement and the dual nature of this requirement to invalidate patents reminds me of the exclamation of the police chief in the movie Casablanca, upon being handed his winnings from roulette, “I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.” Written description and the dual requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph for written description have been the bulwark of United States prosecution, especially interference practice for at least 35 years.

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