Tagged: ANDA

The Biologic Transparency Act (S. 659)

The Biologic Patent Transparency Act (S. 659) was introduced by Senators Susan M. Collins ((R) Maine) and Tim Kaine ((D) Virginia) to address an unintended burden when new biological products are presented to the FDA for approval. According to the sponsors, the Act “seeks to help increase patent transparency, promote biosimilar competition, bring needed biosimilar treatments to patients faster, and ultimately, lower drug prices for consumers.” Currently, there is no “official” listing of patents that relate to biological products comparable to what is available for small molecule drug products that are subject to patent and market exclusivity. Small molecule drug products patent listings are located in the commonly known “Orange Book.” Despite a lot of attention focused on biosimilar products and numerous litigations around the country, there is no official book for biologics that provides the transparency found with small molecule drugs. Instead, an “unofficial” book known as the “Purple Book” purports to identify the patents that cover a biological product. The Biologic Patent Transparency Act remedies this deficiency and requires manufacturers of approved biological products to list the patents covering their products with the FDA. In particular, the Act provides for the following: Codification and publication of the Purple Book to ensure that the public is aware of patents covering a biological product; Listing...

Supreme Court Holds That Non-Public Sales are Invalidating Under Post-AIA Section 102

In a closely watched case directly addressing open questions after the enactment of the America Invents Act (AIA), a unanimous Supreme Court (Thomas, J.) held in Helsinn v. Teva that a sale to a third party, despite being confidential, nevertheless triggered the long-standing meaning of “on sale” under §102(a). Gibbons previously reported on this much anticipated decision. As background, Helsinn owns patents directed to reducing the likelihood of a serious side effect of chemotherapy treatment. Almost two years before applying for a patent, Helsinn and a third party entered into a license agreement and a supply and purchase agreement. The agreements were publicly announced, but required the third party “to keep confidential any proprietary information received under the agreements.” The Federal Circuit held that because the sale between Helsinn and the third party was publicly disclosed, the on-sale bar applied. Before enactment of the AIA, 35 U.S.C. §102(b) barred the patentability of an invention that was “patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent.” By enacting the AIA, Congress amended §102 to bar the patentability of an “invention [that] was patented, described in a printed publication, or...

Stem Cell Transplant-Related Patent Found Valid Under Alice

In Genzyme Corp. v. Zydus Pharmaceuticals (USA) Inc., a Delaware district court recently found two patents directed to methods of mobilizing progenitor/stem cells from bone marrow to the peripheral blood stream for use in stem cell transplantation valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The district court utilized the framework articulated in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014), on which we have previously reported here, here, and here, to determine whether the patent claims covered patent-eligible subject matter or were patent-ineligible “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas[.]” Under the Alice framework, the court first determines if the patent claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, and, if so, then considers whether the claims contain an “inventive concept” which “transform[s] the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” The district court found that the claims at issue were not directed to any patent-ineligible concept under step one of Alice because they were directed to the patent-eligible concept of “using plerixafor, itself a compound that does not naturally exist, to amplify a natural phenomenon – stem cell mobilization – in an unnatural way.” The court then found that, “even if those claims were directed simply to the natural phenomenon...

U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement to Promote Innovation in Biotechnology

On September 30, 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada reached an agreement in principle to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The pending United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes provisions governing the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. This blog post will cover the IP provisions of the USMCA, particularly as applied to pharmaceuticals and biologics. It’s important to note that the provisions of the USMCA prescribe a minimum requirement, some of which is already met or surpassed by the individual countries’ respective patent regimes. 1. Data protection for biologics Under Article 20.F.14, each country must provide, with respect “to the first marketing approval” of a product that “is or contains a biologic,” protection of undisclosed test or other data concerning the safety and efficacy of the product for “a period of at least ten years from the date of first marketing approval of that product.” This ten-year data exclusivity applies “at a minimum” to “a product that is produced using biotechnology processes and that is, or, alternatively, contains, a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product, for use in human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition.” Under Article 20.K.1, this provision need not be implemented until...

Patent Infringement Defendants’ Attempt to Transfer Venue Thwarted

In federal cases, venue transfer is permitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” The defendants in a patent infringement case venued in the District of New Jersey recently failed in their attempt to transfer venue of their cases to the District of Delaware pursuant to § 1404(a). The cases involve the alleged infringement of a patent that covers Suboxone sublingual film for the treatment of opioid dependence. The defendants argued that venue transfer was appropriate based on their consent to venue in Delaware, the discretionary factors outlined in Jumara v. State Farm Insurance, 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995), and the first-filed rule. None of these arguments proved successful, as the magistrate judge issued reports and recommendations denying the motions of defendants Dr. Reddy’s, Teva, and Alvogen Pine Brook. And, the district judge affirmed and adopted the magistrate judge’s opinions. After first concluding that venue for the cases was proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to the patent venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the court turned to the defendants’ arguments for transfer. With respect...

What is “A Regular and Established Place of Business”?: A Case Compendium

Since the TC Heartland decision in which the Supreme Court ruled that the “residence” prong in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), refers only to the state of incorporation and not the definition conferred in the general venue statute, § 1391, parties and courts have focused attention on interpreting the alternative basis for venue under the statute: “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017). Of particular interest is how courts have ruled on what constitutes “a regular and established place of business.” In September 2017, the Federal Circuit clarified that a “regular and established place of business” must meet three general requirements: “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). First, there must be a “physical place,” i.e., a “physical, geographical location in the district from which the business of the defendant is carried out.” Id. at 1362. The Court defined a physical place as a “building or part of a building set apart for any purpose.”...

Supreme Court To Review Whether Non-Public Sales Are Invalidating Under Post-AIA Section 102

The Supreme Court recently agreed to review Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., a case with broad implications for the pharmaceutical industry. In the opinion below, the Federal Circuit held that after the America Invents Act (“AIA”), “if the existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in the terms of sale” for the sale to be invalidating under Section 102. The Court granted Helsinn’s petition for certiorari to answer “[w]hether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.” Before the AIA, § 102(b) barred the patentability of an invention that was “patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent.” By enacting the AIA, Congress amended § 102 to bar the patentability of an “invention [that] was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” In its petition for certiorari, Helsinn argued...

Senator Hatch Proposes Legislation Forcing Challengers to Choose Between Filing a Hatch-Waxman Action or Filing an IPR

On June 13, Senator Orrin Hatch, co-author of the Hatch-Waxman Act, proposed an amendment in the Senate Judiciary Committee to modify the inter partes review (“IPR”) process for pharmaceuticals. The senator published a press release summarizing and explaining the proposed legislation. The amendment, titled the Hatch-Waxman Integrity Act of 2018, intends to “restore the careful balance the Hatch-Waxman Act struck to incentivize generic drug development” by “prevent[ing] alternative procedures for challenging drug patents from tilting the playing field contrary to Hatch-Waxman’s design.” The proposed legislation would amend Sections 505(b)(2) and 505(j)(2)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2) and 355(j)(2)(A) respectively) to require the applicant to certify to the FDA that “neither the applicant nor any party in privity with the applicant, has filed, or will file, a petition to institute inter partes review” in order to be eligible for abbreviated regulatory approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The applicant would further need to certify that it “is not relying in whole or in part on any decision issued by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an [IPR]” in making the certification that the relevant listed patent is invalid or will not be infringed. According to Senator Hatch, the impetus for the proposed amendment is that IPRs are “producing unintended consequences in...

NJ District Courts Continue to Enforce the Disclosure Requirements Regarding Contentions Pursuant to New Jersey’s Local Patent Rules

We previously reported in February 2014 and June 2014 that New Jersey District Court Judges will enforce the District of New Jersey’s Local Patent Rules’ contention disclosure requirements and bar parties from making arguments that were not properly disclosed in their contentions. Consistent with those rulings, in a recent opinion, in Impax Labs., Inc. v. Actavis Labs FL, Inc., Judge Chesler barred one of Actavis’s infringement arguments made during summary judgment as untimely because the argument was not sufficiently disclosed in its infringement contentions. In its opposition brief, Impax argued that Actavis raised new non-infringement arguments based on the pharmacokinetic profiles of its proposed generic product. Actavis claimed that its generic product did not meet claim limitations involving a “maximum concentration” limitation or a “40% fluctuation” limitation for two subsets of asserted claims. Upon review of Actavis’s contentions, the court found that Actavis did sufficiently disclose its non-infringement argument in regard to the “maximum concentration” limitation, but that it did not sufficiently disclose its non-infringement argument regarding the “40% fluctuation” limitation. The court found that Actavis’s non-infringement contentions regarding the “40% fluctuation” limitation stated that “there is no evidence that its products ‘result in a levodopa plasma concentration’ meeting the 40% fluctuation limitation.” Yet, in its summary judgment motion, Actavis expanded that argument by providing a...

What are “Acts of Infringement” and Where is “A Regular and Established Place of Business” for a Hatch-Waxman Defendant: The District of Delaware Weighs in on the Patent Venue Rule

We previously reported on the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, in which the Supreme Court created a new patent venue rule. The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provides that patent infringement suits “may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court held that “[a]s applied to domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce] in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.” A Delaware District Court recently considered the provision of the patent venue statute not addressed by TC Heartland – where venue is proper if a “defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business” in the context of a defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., a patent infringement matter brought under the Hatch-Waxman statute and filed before the TC Heartland decision, the parties did not dispute that, in light of TC Heartland, the defendant, a West Virginia corporation, could not be said to “reside” in Delaware. Thus, venue would be proper in Delaware only if the defendant committed act of infringement in Delaware and had a...