Paragraph IV to Paragraph III Conversion Does Not Deprive a District Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman Cases

Paragraph IV to Paragraph III Conversion Does Not Deprive a District Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman Cases

In a significant Hatch-Waxman decision, a Delaware District Court recently denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), rejecting the argument that the conversion of the defendants’ Paragraph IV certifications to Paragraph III certifications deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but granted the defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In H. Lundbeck A/S v. Apotex Inc., the defendants converted their Paragraph IV certifications for certain patents at issue to Paragraph III certifications. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), an ANDA filer must make any one of four (I-IV) certifications for each Orange Book listed patent. A Paragraph IV certification is an ANDA filer’s statement that it intends to market its bioequivalent pharmaceutical product before the expiration of a patent listed as covering that product because the ANDA filer believes such patent is either not infringed or invalid. A Paragraph III certification is an ANDA filer’s statement that it will not market its bioequivalent product until after the expiration of a patent listed as covering that product. The Court reasoned that in a Hatch-Waxman action, subject matter jurisdiction exists when a patent owner alleges that the filing...

“Good Cause” Not Required for Contention Amendments in the District of Delaware

“Good Cause” Not Required for Contention Amendments in the District of Delaware

In Bio Delivery Sciences International Incorporated v. Alvogen PB Research & Development LLC, a Delaware District Court recently denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike two prior art references from the defendants’ supplemental invalidity contentions, reasoning that the defendants were not obligated, as the plaintiffs argued, to demonstrate good cause for the amendment. The court noted that the case’s scheduling order did not contain a “good cause” requirement for amending contentions or a requirement that contentions be amended before the date on which the defendants served their amended contentions. The court reasoned that, while the amended contentions did need to comport with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, an analysis under the Pennypack factors did not require striking the references. In particular, the “possibility of curing the prejudice” and “likelihood of disruption of trial” factors militated strongly in the defendants’ favor because the plaintiffs did not need further discovery on the references and could address them easily in their expert reports, which would not have any impact on the trial date. Interestingly, had these defendants been litigating in the District of New Jersey they would have been obligated to demonstrate “good cause,” where Local Patent Rule 3.7 requires a...

Plaintiffs’ Local Patent Rule 3.2(b) Document Production Sufficient to Support an “Invention Date” Predating a Disclosed “Priority Date”

Plaintiffs’ Local Patent Rule 3.2(b) Document Production Sufficient to Support an “Invention Date” Predating a Disclosed “Priority Date”

Applying the plain language of the District of New Jersey’s Local Patent Rules, Chief Judge Wolfson recently ruled in Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma Corp. v. Sandoz Inc., that the plaintiffs were not precluded from asserting an “invention date” derived from their Local Patent Rule 3.2(b) disclosures that differed from the “priority date” expressly disclosed in their Local Patent Rule 3.1(f) contention disclosures. Local Patent Rule 3.1(f) requires that infringement contentions disclose, “[f]or any patent that claims priority to an earlier application, the priority date to which asserted claim is allegedly entitled.” Local Patent Rule 3.2 governs the document production that must accompany Local Patent Rule 3.1 disclosures and Local Patent Rule 3.2(b) requires the production of “[a]ll documents evidencing the conception, reduction to practice, design, and development of each claimed invention, which were created on or before the date of application for the patent in suit or the priority date identified pursuant to L. Pat. R. 3.1(f), whichever is earlier.” An “invention date” and a “priority date” have distinct meanings in patent law. An “invention date” is the date when the inventor conceived the invention and reduced it to practice and the “priority date” is the filing date of the earliest...

Stem Cell Transplant-Related Patent Found Valid Under Alice

Stem Cell Transplant-Related Patent Found Valid Under Alice

In Genzyme Corp. v. Zydus Pharmaceuticals (USA) Inc., a Delaware district court recently found two patents directed to methods of mobilizing progenitor/stem cells from bone marrow to the peripheral blood stream for use in stem cell transplantation valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The district court utilized the framework articulated in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014), on which we have previously reported here, here, and here, to determine whether the patent claims covered patent-eligible subject matter or were patent-ineligible “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas[.]” Under the Alice framework, the court first determines if the patent claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, and, if so, then considers whether the claims contain an “inventive concept” which “transform[s] the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” The district court found that the claims at issue were not directed to any patent-ineligible concept under step one of Alice because they were directed to the patent-eligible concept of “using plerixafor, itself a compound that does not naturally exist, to amplify a natural phenomenon – stem cell mobilization – in an unnatural way.” The...

Patent Infringement Defendants’ Attempt to Transfer Venue Thwarted

Patent Infringement Defendants’ Attempt to Transfer Venue Thwarted

In federal cases, venue transfer is permitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” The defendants in a patent infringement case venued in the District of New Jersey recently failed in their attempt to transfer venue of their cases to the District of Delaware pursuant to § 1404(a). The cases involve the alleged infringement of a patent that covers Suboxone sublingual film for the treatment of opioid dependence. The defendants argued that venue transfer was appropriate based on their consent to venue in Delaware, the discretionary factors outlined in Jumara v. State Farm Insurance, 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995), and the first-filed rule. None of these arguments proved successful, as the magistrate judge issued reports and recommendations denying the motions of defendants Dr. Reddy’s, Teva, and Alvogen Pine Brook. And, the district judge affirmed and adopted the magistrate judge’s opinions. After first concluding that venue for the cases was proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to the patent venue statue,...

Post-Alice Plaintiffs Beware: The Northern District of California Awards Attorneys’ Fees in Exceptional Case

Post-Alice Plaintiffs Beware: The Northern District of California Awards Attorneys’ Fees in Exceptional Case

Abstract ideas are not patentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. And, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) the Supreme Court set forth a framework to determine whether a patent is directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. Following Alice, defendants frequently move to dismiss patent infringement actions based on Section 101. That is exactly what recently happened in Cellspin Soft, Inc., v. Fitbit, Inc. in the Northern District of California. In that case, the 14 defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 101, arguing that the patents were directed to the “abstract concept” of acquiring, transferring, and publishing data and that the claims recited only “generic computer technology” to carry out the abstract idea, and thus lacked a requisite “transformative step” which would render the abstract idea patentable. The District Court agreed and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. Following their successful motion to dismiss, the defendants moved, again successfully, for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. In patent infringement actions, courts have discretion, pursuant to Section 285, to award attorneys’ fees in an “exceptional case.” And, the district court found that the Cellspin case was just that. In...

What are “Acts of Infringement” and Where is “A Regular and Established Place of Business” for a Hatch-Waxman Defendant: The District of Delaware Weighs in on the Patent Venue Rule

What are “Acts of Infringement” and Where is “A Regular and Established Place of Business” for a Hatch-Waxman Defendant: The District of Delaware Weighs in on the Patent Venue Rule

We previously reported on the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, in which the Supreme Court created a new patent venue rule. The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provides that patent infringement suits “may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court held that “[a]s applied to domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce] in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.” A Delaware District Court recently considered the provision of the patent venue statute not addressed by TC Heartland – where venue is proper if a “defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business” in the context of a defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., a patent infringement matter brought under the Hatch-Waxman statute and filed before the TC Heartland decision, the parties did not dispute that, in light of TC Heartland, the defendant, a West Virginia corporation, could not be said to “reside” in Delaware. Thus, venue would be proper...

Federal Circuit Overturned as SCOTUS Creates a New Patent Venue Rule

Federal Circuit Overturned as SCOTUS Creates a New Patent Venue Rule

In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the national patent litigation landscape when it considered “where proper venue lies for a patent infringement lawsuit brought against a domestic corporation” and held that “[a]s applied to domestic corporations, ‘reside[nce]’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.” In so holding, the Supreme Court altered the established patent venue rule – that a corporation is deemed to reside anywhere in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced – which was established by the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In VE Holding, the Federal Circuit held that the definition of venue in § 1391(c), the general venue statute, also applied to patent cases. The Supreme Court based the TC Heartland decision on its prior ruling in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 335 U.S. 222 (1957) in which, as it described in TC Heartland, it “definitively and unambiguously” held that “residence” in § 1400(b) “refers only to the State of incorporation” as well as its reasoning that “[t]he current version of §...

UK Will Ratify UPC Despite Brexit 0

UK Will Ratify UPC Despite Brexit

Recently, the UK Minister of State for Intellectual Property, Baroness Neville-Rolfe, announced that the UK will implement the Unitary Patent (UP) and Unified Patent Court (UPC). In the announcement, Neville-Rolfe both praised the UP/UPC system as “provid[ing] an option for businesses that need to protect their inventions across Europe” and cautioned that the UK’s decision to implement the UP/UPC system “should not be seen as preempting the UK’s objectives or position in the forthcoming negotiations with the EU.”