Don't Go Over 1%, or the Seed Giant May Come After You!

Last month, we reported on seed giant, Monsanto’s Supreme Court victory involving the question of patent exhaustion with regard to its sale of seed incorporating its patented seed technologies. On Monday, June 10, Monsanto appeared to emerge victorious from another litigation related to its seed technology and business when the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling that a coalition of organic farmers and seed sellers had no standing to seek declaratory judgments of non-infringement and invalidity with respect to Monsanto’s patented seed technologies.

In March 2011, the Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association (“OSGATA”) and other organic farmers and seed sellers decided to take preemptive action against Monsanto, filing suit in district court, challenging Monsanto’s seed patents because they were concerned that Monsanto would be accusing them of patent infringement. OSGATA decided to file the declaratory judgment action because it was concerned that the seeds they used would be “contaminated” with Monsanto trait even though they had no desire or intention to use or sell seeds incorporating Monsanto’s patented seed technologies (“transgenic seeds”), nor did they approve of the use of glyphosate herbicide on their crops. In other words, even if their seeds were inadvertently contaminated with trace amounts of Monsanto’s transgenic seeds, these farmers and seed sellers would not be exploiting the “advantageous” traits of the seeds.

These plaintiffs requested a covenant not to sue from Monsanto, but Monsanto refused. Instead, Monsanto referred to the statement on its website, “[i]t has never been, nor will it be, Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace amounts of our patented traits are present in farmers’ fields as a result of inadvertent means.” Monsanto also offered assurances that it had no intention of asserting patent-infringement claims against OSGATA, and that fears of any such suit, or decisions not to grow certain crops (out of such fear) was unjustified.

The District Court granted Monsanto’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court found no actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), and no injury to OSGATA and others, traceable to Monsanto. In addition, the Court noted that Monsanto’s aggressive stance in regards to “patent-infringement suits against other, dissimilar parties . . .” by itself was insufficient to create subject matter jurisdiction.

In affirming the District Court’s dismissal, the Federal Circuit concluded that Monsanto’s website statement had a similar effect as a covenant not to sue, and that Monsanto was now judicially estopped from taking a contrary position in future litigation. Furthermore, the Court adopted OSGATA’s argument that “trace amounts” should be defined as approximately 1% and that Monsanto, who did not contest this, “disclaimed any intent to sue inadvertent users or sellers of seed that are inadvertently contaminated with up to one percent of seeds carrying Monsanto’s patented traits.”

Although this ruling went in favor of Monsanto, it could be viewed as a partial victory for both sides. Monsanto, and other patent holders for that matter, through the use of websites or other public messages, now appear to have another tool to stave off plaintiff standing in declaratory judgment actions. Farmers and seed sellers who wish to avoid the threat of future Monsanto patent infringement actions apparently might be able to do so by taking steps to ensure that their seeds are not contaminated with more than “trace” (greater than 1%) amounts of Monsanto’s transgenic seeds. Additionally, farmers seeking to challenge Monsanto’s patents potentially can avoid standing issues by alleging contamination in excess of 1%.

OSGATA and other appellants are considering an appeal to the Supreme Court. Stay tuned.


James J. Kang is an Apprentice in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Estelle J. Tsevdos, a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, co-authored this post.

Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Already LLC v. Nike, Inc.

On Wednesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of Already, LLC d/b/a Yums v. Nike, Inc. As we reported previously, that case arose from an appeal of the Second Circuit’s decision affirming the Southern District of New York’s holding that a covenant not to sue entered in a trademark dispute ended the case and controversy between the parties. We enclose the full transcript of the oral argument. 

During oral argument, at which this author was present, Already, LLC d/b/a Yums’ (“Yums”) attorney argued that the covenant would force it to be the "involuntary licensee" of Nike. He analogized the challenged registration to a scarecrow, arguing that it creates "informational injury" by improperly stopping competitors from producing similar shoes, under color of right.

Significantly, Nike’s covenant not-to-sue only extended to claims based on Yums’ current and past products and "colorable imitations" thereof. It did not preclude that Yums might later be sued based on the challenged registration for other shoe designs.

Nike’s attorney urged the Court that the covenant obviated any injury to Yums arising from the registration. He argued that Yums had failed to show that it had plans to produce any shoes that would not be covered by Nike's covenant not-to-sue. However, he admitted that, if Yums had plans to produce the exact shoe covered by Nike's registration, sufficient harm would be present for the federal court to have continuing Article III jurisdiction.

The justices asked a number of questions, including whether any covenant not-to-sue could ever suffice in a trademark action if the underlying registration remained valid. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor both noted that the record did not affirmatively show that Yums had plans to develop an exact replica of the Nike shoe at issue. However, Yums’ attorney reminded the court that the record was not fully developed in the district court proceeding, and urged that the procedural posture of the case is analogous to that of a summary judgment, where all reasonable inferences should be drawn in Yums' favor, as the non-moving party.

The Supreme Court is expected to hand down its decision prior to June 30, 2013. Gibbons will continue to monitor developments in this case.


Catherine M. Clayton is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.