Former Judge Paul Michel Discusses Proposed Changes to US Patent System

A Message from the Chair, David E. De Lorenzi:

David E. De Lorenzi  Attorney at Law"Congress Needs to Act" is the first article published by Judge Paul R. Michel since his retirement from the Federal Circuit, where he served as the Chief Judge. Judge Michel's below speech was given on July 21, 2010, at the Global Intellectual Property Center of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, providing commentary on the current state of the nation's patent system and how the system can be improved to bolster US economic growth.

Judge Michel will be a featured speaker on these same topics in October at the Gibbons Institute/NJIPLA Fall program in Newark, New Jersey. More details on the October program will be posted next month.

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"American economic security is threatened in a way Congress has failed to recognize. Our biggest challenge is stemming the outflow of jobs, talent, technology and manufacturing. All four losses drain away national economic power. All result from the same cause: chronic under-financing of our innovation infrastructure. Although invisible, it is our nation’s greatest asset. Strengthening it can assure our prosperity and restore our technological leadership. We urgently need to increase invention and make new products that Americans and others will need, want and buy. To increase innovation, however, we must increase investment.

And it is needed immediately because we are already losing our international lead in technology and our global competitiveness. In a recent study, the United States came in dead last of the 40 top technology countries in the world in strengthening its innovation infrastructure over the last decade. Foreign inventive activity has surged to the point where filings in the United States Patent and Trademark Office by foreign entities now equal filings by Americans. Filings in the Chinese patent office by Chinese companies show exponential advances in twelve out of twelve top technologies.

Public finance for increased investment in innovation, however, is not available. It has been exhausted by the cost of two, concurrent and continuing wars and a decade of fiscal mismanagement, saddling us with a huge annual debt payments and recent annual budget deficits of many hundreds of billions of dollars, and this year of $1.5 Trillion. In this recession when tax revenues are down, obtaining even a modest increase in public R&D funding will be difficult, if not impossible. Actually, the challenge will be to avoid cuts in government R&D funding. The Administration recently instructed all agencies except the Defense Department to plan for a 5% reduction. At best, agency budgets will be frozen. Anyway, private investment has always supported much R&D by research-based companies, universities, and other innovators. Only increased private finance, then, can fund the needed increase in research and development. But how do we incentivize increased private investment in innovation? The answer is simple: strengthen the intellectual property systems – patents, trademarks, trade secrets, copyright, but especially patents. What we most need is faster, sounder patent grants, plus swifter, stronger, subtler court enforcement. After all, no one can be expected to invest without confidence in a return. Patents, and the protection of investment they afford, provide the only incentives strong enough to cause a big enough increase in private investment in innovation.

A primary engine of American recovery and resurgence therefore will have to be an improved patent system. Without that, both short-term recovery and long-term prosperity will be stunted. By “system”, I mean primarily the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal courts, which, along with the International Trade Commission, afford the only mechanisms to enforce patent rights.

Using patents to spur both economic and technological advances is hardly a new idea. They have been a primary engine of economic growth and technological progress since 1790 when the First Congress passed the first Patent Act. Unlike today’s Congress, the founders knew patents promote national prosperity, economic growth, and technological progress. Patents have promoted repeated surges of technological advance, the most recent in the information technology revolution of the 1990’s. Notice that this was the last time our country had a balanced budget. And now, bio-tech shows promise of another surge.

Note, too, that if we strengthen the patent system, the job creation needed if our country is to rehire the 15 million unemployed workers, half from the recent recession, and add 13 million new jobs by 2018 to absorb a growing labor force will naturally follow. So will migrations of the technologically talented. If more R&D is done here, they will come here and stay, at least if we fix our broken visa system. Otherwise, foreign talent studying at our research universities will all return home. Our own leading technologists will also go elsewhere, just as is now happening with U.S. companies such as Intel and Applied Materials. Both will soon open large research laboratories headed by their top American researchers, not in California but in China.

A few commentators, despite all evidence, still assume the nation could afford a large increase in public R&D funding. Others assume that even though public revenue is unavailable, the needed R&D can be funded by company revenues. But that is not realistic. Most innovative companies are new and small. Many do not yet make profitable products. Some do not yet sell any products. Yet the majority of new technologies and 75% of new jobs are now being created by small, young, companies. Therefore, the firms with the least revenue to support their R&D are those most needing and deserving private investment. Biotech start-ups are only one example. Without it, many of them will die. With it, medical science, public health and national wealth will surge. Besides, 2/3 of the economic growth and ¾ of the new jobs since WWII came from innovation, and technology-related jobs pay 2.5 time average salaries.

Well, what is wrong with the present patent system? First, and foremost: delay -- health and welfare-diminishing, wealth-reducing, job- destroying, technology-impeding delay. In some technologies it now takes, at least, 4-6 years even to get a patent. The product life-cycle is often shorter than that. For all technologies the average wait is three years. That is two times longer than in 1990. Too long! And it is going up. Even worse, because nearly all applications must by law be published at 18 months, foreign competitors can pirate inventions for years before the patents issue, for until then patent owners have no rights against infringements whether produced here or imported. No wonder foreign competitors minutely monitor the PTO website! The story is told that thousands of Chinese engineers sit at computers reading U.S. patent applications rather than doing research in labs.

Why such extensive delay? Because for two decades the patent office has been grossly underfunded. And it is still losing ground. It operates entirely on user fees paid by applicants and patent owners -- fees that were set by Congress six years ago -- at levels that do not support necessary operations. The PTO lacks sufficient numbers of examiners, especially experienced examiners, and modern computer systems. Imagine, the government’s own technology agency using decades-old computer technology! These are the principal reasons delays are so long.

The patent system is failing primarily because the patent office is failing. In a single, blunt word, the patent office has become dysfunctional. Applications have tripled, and the PTO simply cannot keep up. Over 735,000 applications sit unread in a warehouse in Alexandria, Virginia. Note that the warehoused applications equate to almost two years worth of filings. Although some 490,000 applications are being examined, their progress is far too slow. And every year another 460,000 more are filed. Of the 1.2 million applications currently awaiting final disposition, only about 350,000 complete the examination process each year. So the backlog, already intolerable, is actually growing by 110,000 applications per year. It is now four times the backlog of 1990.

There are too few examiners – mostly young engineers and scientists -- and too few with experience. Nearly one third of the examiner workforce has been at the PTO for less than 3 years. But it takes at least 3 years for new examiners to become both competent and efficient. Faulty decisions by inexperienced examiners, like delay itself, harm the system and therefore innovation; such examiners allow patent claims they should reject, blocking innovation, and reject ones they should allow, causing further unnecessary delays and costs for Board appeals. And the lack of quality assurance undermines the presumption of patent validity provided by law and also the credibility of patents in the eyes of the media, academia and the Congress.

The trial courts too are hobbled. Most lack sufficient numbers of judges to expeditiously enforce good patents and invalidate bad ones. Almost 100 judicial vacancies remain unfilled, the highest vacancy rate in the history of the country. Most of these have gone unfilled for many, many months, and some for years. That means the courts are normally 12% understaffed. And almost 100 additional district and circuit judgeships are desperately needed but have yet to be authorized by Congress despite repeated requests by the Judiciary for two decades. So, the courts struggle with almost 200 too few judges because of two decades of Congressional neglect, just like the Congressional neglect of the patent office.

The result of course is long litigation delays that diminish the value of patents and add uncertainty that impedes invention and economic growth. Most patent infringement cases now take 3-5 years to verdict, with each appeal adding at least another year. Like patent examinations, litigations are simply too slow both for the pace of technological advances and for domestic and global markets. Delay must be cut at least in half, and soon. Because of delays caused by chronic underfunding of the Judiciary, innovation incentives are shrinking just when the nation needs them to be growing.

The gears of our patent system seem seized up. Ironically, Congressional inaction is discouraging private action. Obviously we need to strengthen and speed up both examinations and litigations, but only public funds can jump start the process. How so? Although PTO operations should remain financed by user fees, it needs an emergency transfusion of public money to overcome its warehouse backlog of 735,000 and equip it to keep up with the annual influx of 460,000 new applications. It needs thousands of additional examiners and salary increases to retain experienced, quality examiners. Most of all, it needs new computer systems and new space to house the existing workforce, as well as new hires. At present, two thousand of the six thousand examiners work at home, as the PTO lacks sufficient workspace for one-third of its workforce. Thus, even if Congress finally raises the fees, which it should, resolving the current crisis still requires a large infusion of public money. That is because much of the fee revenue arrives only years after the patents issue as maintenance fees. But money is needed now. Deferral will have corrosive consequences that cannot be undone. Therefore, I suggest the following emergency steps:

First, a one-time capital investment in the PTO of one billion dollars. It could be spent over the next several fiscal years, but it should be authorized and appropriated promptly. That should be enough to replace the IT systems, which the Director correctly calls “moribund,” and secure work space for the examiners. It probably could also pay for new hires to beat down the backlog.

Second, the Congress must guarantee by law that the PTO can spend an amount equal to the user fees paid by patent applicants and holders. Between 1992 and 2010, Congress diverted $759 million in fees paid to the PTO by patent holders and applicants and directed them instead to other governmental activity. In this year alone, Congress will siphon off an estimated $230 million in PTO user-paid fees. Essentially, PTO users have unwittingly been paying an additional tax subsidizing governmental expenditures that have nothing to do with PTO functions. Permanently ending this Congressional practice, called “fee diversion”, is a necessary precondition to reviving the PTO. If Congress continues spending user fees for other purposes, raising fee levels will have little effect.

But there is a Catch-22. If public R&D funding is already “maxed out” and other public funding otherwise already committed, then how could Congress find a billion dollars for the PTO? Well, when Congress wishes, it freely spends many billions of dollars, such as the $700 billion it provided to Wall St. I suggest only $1 billion, once. Just $1 billion, spread over several years, but provided soon.

Is my suggestion realistic? Yes, if Congress were to follow proper priorities. This public investment is absolutely necessary to our country’s short-term and long-term prosperity.

Well, would such capital investment fix everything that is wrong with the patent office? Maybe not everything, but certainly all the big problems. And, without it, other reforms will surely not suffice. Although other remedial steps are also necessary, most have already been started, at least on a pilot basis, by the new Director, David Kappos. But without an immediate, large, one-time dose of public funding, even his very sound leadership initiatives cannot produce the needed results and do so fast enough. In fact, despite his initiatives, the examiner corps is still shrinking, losing 500 examiners in the last several years. A net loss is again predicted for this year. So just when the patent office needs more examiners, it has fewer.

In his recent testimony before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, Director Kappos admitted that it will take many years to achieve timely examinations even if in the next two fiscal years Congress allows him to hire 1,000 new examiners per year. But since each year 500 leave, the total gain would only be 1,000, not 2,000. A much larger increase in examiners is needed to eliminate the backlog of 735,000 warehoused applications and assure timely examination of 460,000 new applications. My estimate is 3,000 additional examiners are needed if the PTO is to examine all incoming applications within one year.

What else? First, let the PTO open satellite offices in places like Detroit, and Houston, and hire unemployed engineers, patent agents and patent attorneys who are already experienced IP professionals. They can be productive immediately, unlike new graduates who need years of training. But again, Congressional authorization is probably needed. Under current law, most employees must work at the PTO campus in Alexandria, Virginia, or at home with regular reporting in person if living over 50 miles away.

Second, pay examiners better. Congress also controls the pay structure for examiners. But the gap between the examiner pay schedule and the General Schedule for non-technical civil servants is shrinking. Industry, I am sure, would willingly pay higher fees to enable the PTO to pay more competitive salaries to retain skilled examiners. Congress should raise these fees and pay levels.

What about ending the delays in court? In addition to promptly filling nearly 100 vacancies and Congress adding the nearly 100 judgeships long requested, what else could be done?

First, more frequent use of expert special masters to do claim construction and magistrate judges to police discovery would help. Second, discovery should be narrowed. If discovery were limited largely to evidence that can actually be used at trial, much delay as well as excess cost could be avoided. Staging discovery by issue also looks promising. But both require closer judicial supervision which in turn requires more magistrate and district judges.

The bottom line is this: unless Congress invests more in the America patent system, private investors will not. We must encourage investors to boost their investments in order to surge American R&D. The PTO and the courts both need more money, more space and more adjudicators. Congress must “prime the pump”. Only then can private investment take over. This is the only practical way to increase innovation and restore our nation’s competitive advantage. This strategy could restore us as the technology leader of the world, increase private and public revenues and stock values, raise our standard of living and create millions of new, high-paying jobs. With so clear and compelling a strategy, Congress need not hesitate to act.

But because members don’t understand that patents increase prosperity, they must first hear from you, from private sector leaders in law, business, media, and academia. The question is: Will you advocate these reforms to Congress?"


David E. De Lorenzi is Chair of the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

 

USPTO Recognizes That One Size Does Not Fit All

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in an attempt to offer patent applicants more choices, recently proposed establishing a three-tiered examination system. Under the current system, with the exception of accelerated examination and those cases granted “special” status, all non-provisional patent applications go into the same queue for examination and are taken up in due course. Under the new proposal, an applicant would be able to choose either prioritized examination (Tier I), traditional examination (Tier II) or delayed examination (Tier III).

USPTO’s Goal is to Reduce Time to Issuance to One Year
Currently, a first office action occurs on average at 27.2 months and a patent takes, on average, 34.6 months to issue.

Tier I priority examination, is shooting for 4 months to first office action and 12 months to issuance. The goal of the proposed amendment is to provide applicants more flexibility in managing prosecution, reducing prosecution pendency, and enhancing efficiency, all without impacting the current workload or time to issuance of traditional (Tier II) applications.

Good Practices to Speed Up Any Examination
To achieve such a quick turn around, a priority application will be placed in a queue for all priority applications separate from Tier II cases, ensuring they will be taken up and considered in a more timely manner. Applications claiming priority from prior filed foreign applications will have to wait a bit and furnish some additional information before jumping onto the Tier I examination track. As explained in the Federal Register, to maximize the benefits of the priority examination, an applicant should be knowledgeable of the prior art, draft claims as broad as possible in view of the art and as narrow as one is willing to accept, respond within the shortened statutory periods, and be prepared to conduct examiner interviews.

Speed Comes With a Price
Anyone seeking to utilize Tier I or prioritized prosecution will be required to pay an additional fee to cover the priority request. The as yet-to-be-determined fee, will be used to hire and train the additional examiners needed to ensure that priority examination can be completed within the projected time frames. Additionally, to facilitate the processing of Tier I applications, the USPTO is considering limiting the number of claims in a Tier I application to 4 independent claims and 30 total claims.

Tier III examination on the other hand will allow an applicant to defer docketing of an application for review for up to 30 months after filing. By choosing to delay examination, an applicant can explore the market and focus on commercialization. If at any time during that 30 month period, the applicant deems the invention worth pursuing, they can request examination (and pay the fee) anytime prior to the expiration of the period. Failure to request examination will result in abandonment. The realization that one size does not fit all is a refreshing and welcome attempt by the USPTO to speedup the examination process and offer an applicant more choices.


Andrew M. Grodin is an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

12-Month Extension to the Provisional Patent Application Period - Buying More Time to Commercialize Your Invention

On April 2, 2010, the USPTO issued a press release and published in the Federal Register a request for comment on a proposed change that would effectively give applicants a 12-month extension to the current provisional application period. Under the current rules, an applicant must file a nonprovisional application within 12-months after the filing of a provisional application pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) and must thereafter complete any missing parts to that application within a time period of up to a maximum of seven months.

The latest proposed revision to the missing part practice would now give applicants an additional 12-month period under which to complete this application. Even with the new proposed revision, a nonprovisional application must still be filed within the first 12-month period following the filing of a provisional application and have a properly executed oath or declaration along with at least one claim. Applicants, however, will now be given up to a year rather than seven months to complete the nonprovisional application by payment of the required search fee and a nominal late payment surcharge. It should be noted that this change would not affect foreign filings, which must still be filed within 12 months after the filing date of a provisional application in accordance with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Also, by exploiting the delayed payment, an applicant foregoes his right to opt not to have the patent application published at 18 months from the provisional patent application filing date.

The USPTO believes that by providing this additional time, applicants may now “ascertain the value of their inventions, thereby helping applicants decide whether to incur the additional costs associated with pursuing patent rights.” While initially expending only a relatively low cost to file the application, the applicant may now take the additional 12-month period to focus their time and efforts on commercialization. Additionally, the USPTO explained that, under the current statutory scheme, applicants routinely file several nonprovisional applications, which are dependant on various provisional applications. By providing an additional 12-month period, the USPTO believes that this will “help applicants focus on their most important applications and conserve USPTO resources.”

While the argument for cost savings is noted, overall this change may be more beneficial to only a relatively small number of pro se applicants who prepare and file applications on their own behalf without the assistance of skilled patent attorneys or agents. For those pro se applicants, this additional time would seem to allow them the opportunity to attempt to commercialize their potential patent while avoiding their only out of pocket expense of having to pay a large portion of the filing fees and ultimately, if and when a patent were to issue, the maintenance fees.

For all other applicants, including nearly all businesses and most individuals, relying on patent attorneys or agents for preparing patent applications, the cost of careful preparation of a patent application by the patent attorney or agent is the majority of where the out of pocket costs are spent rather than in the filing fees. Most business entities advantageously rely on in-house attorneys and/or retained outside patent counsel to draft the patent application for obtaining broad patent protection. As a consequence, it would be rare that such an applicant under the present rules would be willing to pay extension fees for merely delaying payment of the search fee.

Further, the USPTO notes that with regard to this proposed change, the non-provisional patent application need only include a single claim. However, the cost of preparing additional claims is incremental to the cost of preparing the patent application specification and single claim. Furthermore, it will be questionable whether this additional time will even be used to its fullest extent since the revision is adding just under half a year to the process in light of the current time to respond to a missing parts notice of up to seven months. Comments are to be submitted to the USPTO on or before June 1, 2010. Stay tuned - we will keep you updated.


Robert E. Rudnick is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Carrie A. Longstaff, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, assisted in the preparation of this post.

The Written Description Requirements of 35 U.S.C. ยง112 and Ariad Pharms. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Recently certain members of the patent law bar have expressed surprise that the Federal Circuit has used the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph to invalidate patents such as the University of California’s patent directed to insulin in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., and Genentech’s patent directed to production of human growth hormone in Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S. This issue has come to the forefront again in Ariad’s pending per curiam appeal from the Federal Circuit decision in Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., vacated and rehearing en banc granted. Oral argument in the case was held on December 7, 2009. In the case under appeal, the Ariad patent was held not to meet the written description requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph.

The surprise of the patent bar to the Federal Circuit’s use of this written description requirement and the dual nature of this requirement to invalidate patents reminds me of the exclamation of the police chief in the movie Casablanca, upon being handed his winnings from roulette, “I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on here.” Written description and the dual requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 first paragraph for written description have been the bulwark of United States prosecution, especially interference practice for at least 35 years.

The Dual Requirements for Written Description Are Part of 35 U.S.C. §112

With respect to a patent specification, the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 sets forth that the specification shall contain a written description of:

  1. the invention; and
  2. the manner of making and using the invention (the enablement requirement)

Therefore, there are two requirements set forth in this statute with respect to the written description, one as to the invention and the other as to enablement (the manner of making and using the invention). The case of In re Barker, 194 U.S.P.Q. 474 (C.C.P.A. 1977) explicitly articulated that 35 U.S.C. §112 first paragraph set forth these two separate requirements for written description. To provide a written description of the invention, the specification must include a written description of each and every element of the claimed subject matter. This was enunciated by the Federal Circuit in Lockwood v. American Airlines. In the Lockwood case, the Federal Circuit specifically stated that:

It is the disclosure of the application that counts. Enablement of a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed but which would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.

The Written Description Requirement Has Been The Backbone of U.S. Patent Law Well Before 1967

The requirement for written description was reiterated by the C.C.P.A. in In re Ruschig. In Ruschig, the C.C.P.A. specifically held that a description of a genus does not constitute a description of a claimed subgenus unless that specific claimed subgenus is specifically described in the specification. The Ruschig case was directed to whether the specification contained a written description of a specific claimed compound. The claimed compound in Ruschig had a phenyl group substituted with chlorine and the C.C.P.A., in a prosecution and interference setting, held that there was no written description of this compound even though the application disclosed that phenyl ring could be substituted with chlorine or bromine. Discussing the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, the C.C.P.A. stated as follows:

Appellants refer to 35 USC 112 as the presumed basis for this rejection and emphasize language therein about enabling one skilled in the art to make the invention, arguing therefrom that one skilled in the art would be enabled by the specification to make chlorpropamide. We find the argument unpersuasive -- the question is not whether he would be so enabled but whether the specification disclosed the compound to him, specifically, as something appellants actually invented.

379 F.2d at 995.

Ariad May Not Affect the Law as to the Written Description Requirement and Its Dual Nature

The outcome of the per curiam appeal in the Ariad case may not affect the law as to the written description requirement and its dual nature because the appeal does not challenge these requirements for written description. The issue in Ariad is whether the describing of a claimed method which utilizes a compound to regulate by altering the transcription factor of specific genes to express proteins is sufficient to provide a written description for this method, even though no specific compound is disclosed for such regulation. Therefore, the Ariad application claims the use of any compound which provides a specific function and the issue is whether this description is sufficient for a written description of the invention and to enable the invention. The issue presented in Ariad is not directed to the fact that there is no new matter claimed which is not disclosed but whether the written description of the invention in chemical and biotech cases requires the definition of compounds by structure, formula, chemical name or physical properties and not by function. Therefore, the Ariad case never really challenges the basic requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112 for written description that, for at least 40 years, have and remain instrumental to the operation of the U.S. patent system.


William H. Epstein is Counsel to the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.

Duty of Disclosure: Applicant's Contradictory Statements to EPO and USPTO Support Finding of Inequitable Conduct

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 2008-1511 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 25, 2010) held that applicant’s statements made in proceedings before foreign patent offices may be required disclosures in prosecution before the USPTO (“PTO”), particularly when those statements directly contradict other statements made during prosecution. From the court’s holding: “An applicant’s earlier statements about prior art, especially one’s own prior art, are material to the PTO when those statements directly contradict the applicant’s position regarding that prior art in the PTO.”

The Therasense case involved U.S. Pat. No. 5,820,551, for a strip electrode used to measure the level of glucose in blood. The ‘551 patent is related to an earlier U.S. patent and its European counterpart. The statement “Optionally, but preferably when being used on live blood, a protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, permeable to water and glucose molecules” appeared in the specifications of all three patents.

In 1993, the European patent was revoked in an opposition proceeding based on a German reference. In a successful appeal to withdraw the revocation, the patentee distinguished the patented invention’s “optionally, but preferably” membrane requirement from the German reference, which required a membrane.

A few years later, during prosecution of the ‘551 patent, the prosecuting attorney, who was familiar with the EPO opposition proceedings, established a new point of novelty before the USPTO to advance the prosecution of the ‘551 patent. That new point of novelty was that never before was the sensor known to work without a membrane. This assertion directly contradicted an earlier statement made by the applicant during the EPO opposition proceedings. See Therasense at pages 19–23.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of invalidity of U.S. Pat. No. 5,820,551 due to inequitable conduct by applying the standard recently summarized by the Federal Circuit in McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc.

To establish inequitable conduct by failure to disclose, the asserting party must show materiality of the information and the intent to deceive. The trial court held that the prosecuting attorney knew that to disclose the EPO opposition arguments would defeat the patent grant before the USPTO. The trial court then balanced the levels of materiality and intent, and found the withheld information “richly material” and that the prosecuting attorney had no explanation for his conduct, and that this was proved by clear and convincing evidence.

As we previously posted, a patent applicant’s duty of disclosure may also extend to references and office actions in “similar” but unrelated, co-pending patent applications. The Therasense and McKesson cases show continued development in the caselaw of inequitable conduct. Stay tuned for future developments.


Frank A. Bruno is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department. Lucy Emhardt, an Associate in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department, assisted in the preparation of this post.

USPTO and Practitioners Discuss Disclosures from Similar Applications

During a recent AIPLA-sponsored discussion at the USPTO, patent practitioners met with heads of various Technology Centers to discuss USPTO caseloads and recent events. One of the more interesting topics was the increasing number of disclosures from applicants in light of McKesson and more recent inequitable conduct cases and measures that may be taken by the USPTO and practitioners in response.

In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 2006-1517 (Fed. Cir. 2006) the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of inequitable conduct for failure to disclose materials to the USPTO in violation of an applicant’s duty of disclosure under 37 C.F.R. 1.56. In that case, the patent attorney handled two similar, yet unrelated, pending patent applications before the USPTO and did not disclose in connection with one patent application certain documents, such as an office action and a prior art reference, cited in the other similar patent application.

In view of McKesson, patent practitioners may give additional consideration to disclosing office actions and references between related patent applications as well as office actions and references found in unrelated, yet similar patent applications. As the number of related applications and similar patent applications grows, the disclosure process may become more challenging due to the number of documents to cite and the timing of disclosure. For example, if, after a patent application has been allowed, an office action appears in a related or similar patent application, then the applicant may file an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) disclosing the office action and along with a mandatory and costly payment for a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) to reopen prosecution of the allowed patent application so that the Examiner may review the office action and references cited therein.

During the discussion at the USPTO, the participants considered options such as a special “After-allowance RCE” of reduced price that would pay for the Examiner to review references disclosed by the applicant in the situation described above. Also of note was a suggestion that a feature be implemented within the USPTO’s electronic database that would allow applicants to link applications to allow office actions and references to be automatically disclosed between applications. This issue is on the USPTO’s radar, so stay tuned for developments.


Frank A. Bruno is a Director in the Gibbons Intellectual Property Department.